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Abstract: In this paper we make a critique of the standard stability re-
sults already established in a basic two period OLG model. Under an al-
ternative interpretation (competitive financial markets), we are able to
select the test equilibrium in the long run, in such a way that the economy
can reach the Golden Rule Steady State, even when at this interest rate,
all young agents are creditors. We show that even if the economy starts
with only young people —referred to as the Garden of Eden Economy—,
it also reaches the Golden Rule Steady State. Additionally, as a by-prod-
uct of this study, we obtain a complete characterization of the possible
equilibria.
Keywords: OLG models, selection of equilibria, Golden Rule Steady State,
Samuelson Case, Garden of Eden Economy.
Resumen: En este trabajo presentamos una crítica de algunos resultados
existentes en relación con las dinámicas posibles en un modelo de gene-
raciones traslapadas estándar. Bajo hipótesis alternativas (mercados fi-
nancieros competitivos), es posible seleccionar el mejor equilibrio en el
largo plazo, de tal modo que la economía alcanza el equilibrio estaciona-
rio de la Regla de Oro, aun cuando, prevaleciendo dicho tipo de interés,
todos los agentes son prestamistas. Mostramos que, aun en el caso en que
la economía empieza sólo con jóvenes —situación que se suele denominar
como El Jardín del Edén—, también se alcanza la Regla de Oro. Adicional-
mente, obtenemos una completa caracterización de los equilibrios posibles.
Palabras clave: modelos de generaciones traslapadas, selección de equi-
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Introduction
n this paper we present an alternative point of view (competitive
financial markets) in order to interpret the basic OLG model in the
case that the economy, in the aggregate, is saving (called the Samuelson
Case Economy). This new interpretation allows us to find alternative
dynamics and stability results, in such a way that the best steady
state is selected (the Golden Rule steady state, the optimal steady sta-
te), in sharp contrast to the standard analysis, according to which in a
Samuelson Case Economy, the Golden Rule steady state is unstable
and the non-trade steady state (which is non-optimal) is asymptoti-
cally stable, so that the economy is converging to a non-optimal steady
state.
We also have found some new results valid for both our point of
view and the standard point of view, specially in relation to the classi-
fication of the possible equilibria.
To better understand the motivation of our study, we will review
the established results. In the paper by Samuelson (1958), a station-
ary two period OLG economy with homogeneous agents endowed with
one unit of a perishable good in the first period of their lives and noth-
ing in the second period was considered, in order to present a general
equilibrium explanation of positive interest rates. As is well known
by now, Samuelson found that an equilibrium interest rate exists which
is equal to the growth rate of the population, referred to as the Golden
Rule Interest Rate, and the corresponding constant consumption pro-
gram is called the Golden Rule Steady State.
Four aspects of this model (imposing the market clearing condi-
tion, that is, the feasibility condition with equality) have been exten-
sively studied: optimality, stability (dynamics), sensibleness of the
model’s results and, finally, sensibleness of the model itself. The opti-
mality issue for the simple version studied here is indeed a closed
question, namely, that the Golden Rule Steady State is always inter-
temporally optimal. However, regarding the other steady state corre-
sponding to the constant program given by the endowments, entitled
the Non-Trade Steady State, we have two possible results. If all young
people at the Golden Rule Interest Rate are debtors (referred to as the
Classical Case Economy), the Non-Trade Steady State is optimal,
whereas if all young people at the Golden Rule Interest Rate are credi-
tors (referred to as the Samuelson Case Economy), it is not (see, for
example, Malinvaud, 1953; Starret, 1972; and Gale, 1973). Notwith-
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standing, with respect to the three other aspects, there are still some
open questions, which are the subject of this paper.
First, let us consider the issues of stability and sensibleness of the
model’s results. Gale (1973) showed that there are only two steady
states, the Golden Rule Steady State and the Non-Trade Steady State.
Furthermore, he showed that in a Classical Case Economy, the Non-
Trade Steady State is unstable. On the other hand, in a Samuelson Case
Economy, the Non-Trade Steady State is locally stable. In order to
draw our interpretation from these results, it is worth clarifying the
meaning of the classification Classical Case Economy and Samuelson
Case Economy. To fix ideas, consider the extreme case that Samuelson
analyzed, that in which the second period endowment is zero. In this
situation, the economy is always a Samuelson Case Economy. Now,
this, however, is the most reasonable scenario that one can imagine in
order to set up a model with almost any analytical objective: Most
people in real life can be described as having a unit of the good when
young and having nothing (almost nothing) when old. But, surpris-
ingly enough, the model then predicts that there will be no trade at all,
or even if there was, the economy will converge to the Non-Trade Steady
State, this Non-Trade Steady State being non-optimal. Summarizing:
A Samuelson Case Economy —perhaps the most reasonable set up for
applications—, if left to work through free markets (imposing the
market clearing condition), always ends in a non-optimal situation.
Nevertheless, this is not the most paradoxical fact of this result: The
model says that even in an extreme situation of necessity (the agents
have no units of the good in the second period), they will not use the
possibility that the market is giving to them in order to obtain goods
when old. Observe that if one interpreted this situation in terms of
real life, the agents would be dying when old, but not because of a
natural death: They would be dying due to starvation!1 This observa-
tion begs the questions: 1) What are the reasons for these paradoxical
results? 2) Is it possible in this model to present an alternative and
reasonable view in such a way that a Samuelson Case Economy reaches
or converges to the optimal Golden Rule Steady State? As mentioned
above, in this paper we show the reasons for these results and we
demonstrate that the answer to the second question is yes. Another
1 A reader may think that to die due to starvation or to die because of a natural death is a
non relevant distinction. Think that agents receive at the beginning of the period of life the
corresponding endowments. Then, if the second period endowment is zero, agents have nothing
to consume until the end of the second period, that is, they would die young.194 Guerrero-Luchtenberg: Dynamics and Stability in a Standard OLG Model
point studied in this paper, profoundly connected with the stability
issue, is the so called “Samuelson Impossibility Theorem,” which as-
serts that a Garden of Eden Economy can never converge to the Golden
Rule Steady State (assertion proven in Gale, 1973). More precisely,
the model predicts that a Garden of Eden Economy will forever stay
in the non-optimal Non-Trade Steady State, one in which, exactly as in
the Samuelson Case Economy, people are deciding a sort of collective
suicide, even though the free market structure would provide them a
way out of this situation. Once again, this last comment begs the same
questions 1) and 2) as before. Not surprisingly, the answers are the
same as for the general Samuelson Case Economy.
Second, let us consider the model’s sensibleness. This point resul-
ted to be in question as a consequence of what Samuelson called the “in-
finity paradox revealed,” which reads as follows: Imagine a Samuelson
Case Economy and consider the Golden Rule Steady State, so that, by
definition, all the agents in the economy are creditors and, therefore,
the question comes, Who is then borrowing? The point is that the model
was considered as a “pure loan consumption model.” Of course, con-
sidered such, the question above is pertinent and, furthermore, has no
answer. Instead of that, we will assume that there is a bank that serves
as a financial intermediary, and therefore, the infinity paradox revea-
led disappears as a paradox and the Golden Rule Steady State ac-
quires a clear sense.
As the reader perhaps would be expecting, we are not saying that
the previous stability results are false from a mathematical point of
view. Our argumentation, instead, relies on the following two points:
1) a priori, there are no general economic reasons to impose the feasi-
bility condition with equality; 2) we assume that there are complete
markets because there is a financial market (banks) that offer bonds in
order to allow for savings: That financial market works competitively.
A simple consequence of this fact in this model is that there is no
uniqueness of equilibria. Therefore, our equilibrium paths will be just
examples among all the possible ones. We argue, then, that they are
more reasonable than the equilibrium paths calculated imposing the
feasibility condition with equality. In fact, and fundamentally, our equi-
librium emerges as a direct consequence of imposing a free competi-
tion concept on the financial markets, markets that we introduce in
order to give more sensibleness to the model, as commented before.
The intuition of our alternative assumptions and results goes as
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main alternative assumptions is the existence of competitive financial
markets, which complete the markets. The second is that we do not
assume that the market clearing condition holds, that is, we do not im-
pose, a fortiori, the feasibility condition with equality. For the first
assumption, the usual justification in complete markets theory ap-
plies: The medium by which a market is completed is a bond or, more
generally, an asset, which is, roughly speaking, a piece of paper that
promises to pay a defined quantity (of the good or of money) at some
moment in the future. For the sake of the exposition, in our case, we
will be more concrete. We will assume that there are banks that issue
bonds in order to finance its debt and, as in any competitive market
of bonds (that is, there are more than one bond in the market), given
a level of risk (we assume that there is no risk), the bond that pays
the highest interest rate is the bond that absorbs all the demand. In
relation to the second assumption, the intuition is drawn from the
real life: In productions related with land, it is not too rare to see that,
if the price of a good is too low, the producers decide, to say, to throw
away goods to the sea, in order to increase the price. Finally, the intu-
ition of the argument used to obtain the results is as follows. Imagine
a situation in which the preferences of the agents are such that they
prefer to save more than they do, because the actual plan prescribes a
consumption for the old age too low, but they have enough endow-
ments when young to save more. That is, if it would be possible, they
would prefer to consume less today and more when old to the actual
consumption plan. The banks, knowing that, will then offer the high-
est interest rate possible in the market (because there are more than
one bank), which turns out to be the gross rate of the population. There-
fore, even if the actual consumption plans of the agents would be such
that they use the total offer, they would decide to consume less and to
save more.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I we com-
ment on some related literature. Section II formally presents the model
and in Section III the two main results of this paper are shown. In
Section IV we present the argument in favor of the existence of the
bank and fully develop the argument in favor of our results in Section
III. Lastly, in Section V we add some final remarks.196 Guerrero-Luchtenberg: Dynamics and Stability in a Standard OLG Model
I. Related Literature
Although we do not present our argument as a formal learning pro-
cess, our main result, the selection of the test equilibrium among all
the possible ones, is closely related with the important issue on learn-
ing and the selection of equilibria in OLG models. See, for example, J.
Duffy (1994), J. Bullard (1994), and the references therein. However,
our result has not been obtained previously.
On the other hand, as far as we know, there are no antecedents of
studies dealing with the paradoxical fact of the non-convergence to
the Golden Rule if the OLG economy is a Samuelson Case Economy or
if it is a Garden of Eden Economy. Gale (1973), instead of considering
this fact a sort of collective suicide, provided a logical argument. Now,
the optimality property of the Golden Rule has been extensively stud-
ied and discussed. Starting with Samuelson (1958), the following se-
ries of papers have been written regarding this point: Cass and Yaari
(1966), Lerner (1959a, b), Meckling (1960a, b), Samuelson (1959, 1960),
Phelps (1961), Thompson (1967) and Starret (1972).2 This topic, at least
the formal statement, is clearly understood by now. Finally, regarding
the “infinity paradox revealed,” apart from Samuelson (1958), this
problem is clearly highlighted and considered in Cass and Yaari (1966).
In their opinion, it does not have a solution, that is, it is not possible to
imagine any type of trade in this economy. Actually, they consider the
possibility of a financial intermediary, but they reject it on the basis of
the following argument:
The outlook seems rosy until one takes a brief look at the balance sheet of
our financial intermediary: The balance sheet as of the end of period t
shows zero assets and liabilities of s(1 + n)t,3 where s is the (stationary)
saving ratio of people in their first period of life. This means that at the
end of period t the net worth of the intermediary is given by –s(1 + n)t.
Now by not doing anything (that is, by shutting down) the intermediary
can guarantee itself a net worth of zero and so one might argue that it will
never choose to engage in the aforementioned transactions. (Cass and
Yaari, 1966, p. 360.)
We offer another panorama of the situation which considers two
important points.
2 Of course, we do not pretend to present a complete account of this literature.
3 (1 + n) is the gross population growth.economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIII, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2004 197
First, we must see if this business is profitable for the banker. In
effect, until the banker is able to receive the new assets, the net worth of
the bank is negative. However, it is important to consider that he/she
is not forced to pay the liabilities before that moment. On the other
hand, at the time the obligations have to be paid, he will be receiving
the new assets and thus, will be able to pay them. Therefore, one could
think that the bank is making zero profits, as we do. Indeed, this is a
one period business, and to analyze if it is profitable, one has to wait
until the business is mature, in this case, until the new generation
comes and buys new bonds.4
Second, we must wonder if such a financial institution would be
considered healthy by a monetary authority. The introduction of a
monetary authority in this economy may seem artificial, given that mo-
ney has no natural interpretation here due to that it is difficult to
interpret that there is trade between the goods “the good today” and
“the good tomorrow” —they trade goods today for bonds—. True, but
in any event, if one insists on the existence of an institution in charge
of the supervision of the bank’s behavior,5 the situation is not danger-
ous for society. In any financial institution in real life, one may find
particular moments when its net worth is negative, that is, without
the ability to cover the deposits. What matters is the bank’s ability to
pay the debt at the correct time. To the contrary, the monetary author-
ity would force the bank to contract a new debt at a very high interest
rate or, in the worst case, would force the institution to shut down.
During the day, banks may have a negative net worth, but at the end
of the day, if they are in debt, they can go to the overnight market and
cover it, or they may even accept being in debt, provided that they
have no debt at the end of the natural period of the economy —28 days
in many countries in real life—. In our economy something similar is
happening. Until the bank receives the new assets, it is in debt, but at
the moment the return of the bonds has to be paid, the bank can pay
the debt. Period by period —this is the natural period in our economy
and the natural period of the bank’s business—, the bank is contract-
ing new debts, but period by period is paying the old debt, no con-
sumer would be disappointed. Thus, the monetary authority, if it ex-
4 Indeed, it is a business as many businesses in real life. Think of working the land. The
business man may need funds to begin with. Imagine that he decides to issue bonds, which
promise an interest rate for the next year. This business man is in debt during the whole year,
but at the moment the interest promised by the bonds has to be paid, if the harvest is good
enough, he will pay the debt and the business goes on.
5 In real life, banks and financial institutions are heavily regulated.198 Guerrero-Luchtenberg: Dynamics and Stability in a Standard OLG Model
ists, would consider the bank healthy. In other words, one may think
that the banks are playing a “Ponzi Game” and, indeed, in real life,
many banks are playing a Ponzi Game. Nevertheless, as they are in-
stitution with an infinite lifespan, they can play it. Particulars are not
allowed to play a Ponzi Game.6
II. The Model
We consider a double-ended, stationary overlapping-generations
economy with no production where agents live for two periods. There
is a single, perishable good each period. At each t [ Z, a generation of
agents of size Nt > 0 is born. There is an exogenous gross population
growth rate g > 0, that is, we suppose that Nt + 1 = gNt for all t [ Z.
The first period of their life, agents receive a fixed endowment,
which we normalize to 1. The second period, endowment is denoted by
e > 0. Agents have a continuous intertemporal utility function
u(c0, c1)
strictly increasing in both arguments, where c0, c1 are the consump-
tion levels in the first and second period of their lives, respectively.
The market structure is as follows. There is a bank that works as
a financial intermediary. If people want to lend (save), because they
have little goods for the old age or they are patient people, they buy a
bond that promises to pay Rt = 1 + rt units of the good tomorrow per
unit of the good today, so that the price of the bond is
 
t r + 1
1 , in terms
of the good today. The interest rate rt is offered by the bank. On the
other hand, if people want to borrow, because they have a lot of goods
in the old age or they are impatient people, they borrow from the bank,
and in this case the bank asks an interest rate  t t r r = ¢  as well from
them (in real life, we have  ) t t r r > ¢ , so we are assuming that the bank is
making zero profits. For each generation t, we denote their consump-
tion decisions by c(t) = (c0(t), c1(t + 1)). Therefore, the consumer’s prob-
lem is the following
6 The term “Ponzi Game” is used here, informally, as reference to situations where an agent
(infinitely lived) is rolling over a debt forever, that is, at any time, the current debt is paid by
making a new borrow, promising to pay it in the future, and so forth. See, for example, Blanchard
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An economy so described is then given by e = ((1, e), u, g).
Definition 1 An equilibrium for the economy e is a pair (C, R) where
C = {(c0(t), cl (t + 1))}t [ Z is a sequence of agents’ consumption plans and
R = {Rt}t [ Z is a sequence of positive quantities (called interest rates),
such that
i(i) For all t [ Z, (c0(t), c1(t + 1)) solves (1), and;
(ii) The feasibility condition holds for all t [ Z:
Ntc0(t) + Nt – 1c1(t) # Nt+ eNt – 1. (2)
An equilibrium is a steady state if (c0(t), c1(t + 1)) = (c0, c1) for all
t [ Z.
Notice that the feasibility condition is equivalent to
gc0(t) + c1(t) # g + e. (3)
For completeness, we restate formally the following definitions.
Definition 2 The Golden Rule Steady State is defined as a constant
program  ) , ( ) ( 1 0
GR GR GR c c t c =  for t [ Z such that  ) , ( 1 0
GR GR c c  solves
.
0 ,











+ g £ + g
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(4)
It follows at once from the previous definition, that the pair
(CGR, RGR), where CGR is the constant sequence equal to  ) , ( 1 0
GR GR c c  and
RGR is the constant sequence equal to g, is an equilibrium.
Finally, we present the following.
Definition 3 An economy e = ((1, e), u, g) is a Samuelson Case Economy
if  1 0 <
GR c , and is a Classical Case Economy if  1 0 >
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III. The Results
III.1. The General Samuelson Case
Our first result says that, given a Samuelson Case Economy, even in
the worst case in which there is an equilibrium that is converging to
the non-optimal Non-Trade Steady State, it is possible to find another
equilibrium in which the Golden Rule Steady State is reached.7 For-
mally, we have:
Theorem 4 Let e = ((1, e), u, g) a Samuelson Case Economy. Assume
that there exists an equilibrium ({(c0(t), c1(t + 1))}t [ Z, {Rt}t [ Z) such that
(c0(t), c1(t + 1)) ﬁ (1, e). Therefore, there exists an equilibrium ), ( ({( 0 t c
) } { , ))} 1 ( 1 Z Z ˛ ˛ + t t t R t c and a natural number T, such that we have
) , ( )) 1 ( ), ( ( 1 0 1 0
GR GR c c t c t c = +  and  g = t R  for all t $ T, that is, there exists
an equilibrium in which the Golden Rule Steady State is reached.
Proof: As we have (c0(t), c1(t + 1)) ﬁ (1, e), then there exists a T
such that for all t $ T, we have  ) ( 0 0 t c c
GR <  (recall that in a Samuelson
Case Economy, we have  1 0 <
GR c ). Define
)}. ( 0 { min 0 0 t c c t T
GR < ‡ = 8
Thus, we have  ) ( 0 0 T c c
GR < . Now observe the feasibility condition
at time T (recall (3)):
gc0(T) + c1(T) # g + e.
Consequently, we have
, ) ( 1 0 e T c c
GR + g < + g (5)
since  ) ( 0 0 T c c
GR < . Hence, if we take the sequence  = + ))) 1 ( ), ( ( , ( 1 0 t c t c Rt
)) , ( , ( 1 0
GR GR c c g  from t $ T, we clearly have that
7 Recall that the Non-Trade Steady State is locally stable in a Samuelson Case Economy
(Gale, 1973). Thus, in most situations we will have in fact that relevant equilibria to study are
such that it is converging to the Non-Trade Steady State. If this is not the case, nothing can be
said in general.
8 Notice that we only pay attention on what would happen from t = 0. Therefore, we are
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, ) ( ) ( 1 0 1 0 e c c t c t c
GR GR + g = + g = + g
for all t $ T + 1, since  ) , ( 1 0
GR GR c c  solves (4). Therefore, the sequence
= + ))) 1 ( ), ( ( , ( 1 0 t c t c Rt   )) , ( , ( 1 0
GR GR c c g  solves (1) and satisfies (2) for all
t $ T + 1, because  ) , ( 1 0
GR GR c c  solves (4) and because of (5). Now, let us
define
. and if ))) 1 ( ), ( ( , (
if )) , ( , (







= + T t t c t c R
T t c c
t c t c R t
GR GR t (6)
Now, notice the following facts: First,
))) 1 ( ), ( ( , ( 1 0 + t c t c Rt  solves (1) and satisfies (2) for all t < T,,9
because it coincides with (Rt, (c0(t), c1(t + 1))) if t < T. (7)
Second,
at t = T we have that  , ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 0 1 0 e T c c T c T c
GR + g < + g = + g
due to (5). (8)
Finally, notice that
from t = T + 1 we have that 
GR GR c c T c T c 1 0 1 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( + g = + + + g , so that
  ))) 1 ( ), ( ( , ( 1 0 + t c t c Rt  solves (1) and satisfies (2) for all t > T. (9)
Now, it follows at once from (7), (8) and (9) that the sequence given
in (6) is an equilibrium that reaches the Golden Rule from t = T . This
ends the proof of the theorem. j
Remark 1 It is important to notice the following fact. According to the
equilibrium found in the previous theorem, at time T the feasibility
condition is not binding (8). This situation can be interpreted as that
the young generation at this time is throwing away goods. However,
this is not an argument that can be used in order to reject our equilib-
rium: In real life, there are indeed situations in which people decide to
throw away goods, for example, if a good has a very low price, the
producer many times throw away goods in order to revert the situa-
tion.
9 In section 5.2 we justify why the agents at time T prefer  ) , ( 1 0
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Remark 2 In Geanakoplos (1987), the differences between the Arrow-
Debreu model and OLG models are clearly highlighted. For the two
period models that we consider here, the most important differences
are in relation to the indeterminacy and the non-optimality of the equi-
librium. One of his questions was: Why the equilibrium may not be
optimal in OLG models? An immediate derived question from that one
is the following: Why an optimal equilibrium may not even be locally
stable? In general, it does not seem to be easy to find a simple answer.
Nevertheless, our point of view suggests the possibility of a simple an-
swer: If we allow for the free disposal property to hold, local stability
can be obtained. Thus, the only point to take into account is the feasi-
bility condition.
III.2. The Garden of Eden Economy
The second technical result of this paper says that in a Garden of
Eden Economy the Golden Rule can be achieved, in contrast to the
Samuelson Impossibility Theorem, which asserts that, under the ex-
treme situation where e = 0 (in this case the economy is always a
Samuelson Case Economy), then, if at time zero there are only young
people, no equilibrium can converge to the Golden Rule. In a two pe-
riod case, if we impose the market clearing condition, the result is
trivial. For the case of more than two periods, this conjecture was
proven in Gale (1973).
Now we give formal definitions. A Garden of Eden Economy is
defined as follows. At time t = 0 there are only N0 young people and
from this moment on, the population grows at a rate g, in such a way
that at any time t > 0 are born Nt = g.t
.N0 new agents. The rest of the
elements of the economy are defined as in the Samuelson general case.
The equilibrium then is defined as follows:
Definition 5 An equilibrium for the economy e is a pair (C, R) where
C = {(c0(t), c1(t + 1))}t $ 0 is a sequence of agents’ consumption plans and
R = {Rt}t $ 0 is a sequence of positive quantities (called interest rates),
such thateconomía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIII, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2004 203
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(ii) the feasibility condition holds for all t > 0 that is:
(a) at t = 0
N0c0(t) # N0, (11)
and
(b) for t > 0
Ntc0(t) + Nt – 1c1(t) # Nt + eNt – 1.
Theorem 6 Let e = ((1, e), u, g) a Garden of Eden Economy, where
1 0 <
GR c  (that is, it is a Samuelson Case Economy). Then, the Golden
Rule program is an equilibrium. That is, at time t= 0, the economy
reaches the Golden Rule.
Proof: Just observe that the young generation at time zero can
throw away goods (exactly as the young generation at time T in the
previous theorem), and decide to consume 
GR c0  instead of 1. It follows
at once then that the Golden Rule program is an equilibrium. j
IV. Interpretation and Classification of Equilibria
As we have already commented above, the bank, the financial inter-
mediary, would be making zero profits under our interpretation, in
such a way that the model is sensibly consistent with this assump-
tion. The main point in question here is that the model does not de-
scribe why there are complete markets. It is assumed, so it is assumed
implicitly a mechanism that completes the markets as well. There-
fore, the model, if we do not impose the market clearing condition
(which need not to be assumed in advance, as we argued before), it
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see in the sequel, this fact is behind of our final argumentation. Our
interpretation then will provide a sensible criteria from an economic
point of view in order to select an equilibrium. But, before we proceed
to give it, we will need the following result which, as a by-product,
provides a general classification of the possible equilibria when the
clearing market condition is imposed.
IV.1. Classification of Equilibria
Theorem 7 Let e = ((1, e), u, g) be an economy. Then,
(i) if  Z ˛ + t t
E E R t c t c ) )), 1 ( ), ( (( 1 0  denotes any equilibrium in which the
feasibility condition holds with equality for all t[ Z, that is,
the market clearing condition holds for all t[ Z, then
0 ) ( 1 0 > - t c
E   for all t[ Z or,  0 ) ( 1 0 < - t c
E   for all t[ Z  or
0 ) ( 1 0 = - t c
E  for all t[ Z; in the first case, we call the equilib-
rium to be of the Samuelson Case, in the second case we call it to
be of the Classical Case and, in the third case, we call it to be of
a Garden of Eden Case;
(ii) if  e = ((1, e), u, g)  is a Samuelson Case Economy and
Z ˛ + t t
E E R t c t c ) )), 1 ( ), ( (( 1 0  denotes any equilibrium such that
) )), 1 ( ), ( (( 1 0 t
E E R t c t c + ﬁ ((1, e), r(NT)), where r(NT) is the gross
interest rate corresponding to the Non-Trade Steady State (see
Gale, 1973) and such that for some t, we have  0 ) ( 1 0 > - t c
E ,
then
(ii.1)  0 ) ( 1 0 > - t c
E  for all t $ t, and
(ii.2) g > Rt – 1 for all t large enough.
Proof: (i) Dividing (2) by Nt–1, we obtain
gc0(t) + c1(t) # g + e. (12)
From the budget constraint of problem (1) at time t – 1, we have




and hence (12) becomes
– –
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so  )) 1 ( 1 ( )) ( 1 ( 0 1 0 - - ‡ - g - t c R t c
E
t
E  for all t [ Z. Now, if the market condi-
tion holds for all t [ Z, it follows from (13) that  = - g )) ( 1 ( 0 t c
E
)) 1 ( 1 ( 0 1 - - - t c R
E
t  for all t [ Z and therefore the claim in (i) follows at
once.




all t > t and the claim is proven.
(ii.2) Provided that  0 )) ( 1 ( 0 > - t c
E  for all t $ t, and rearranging (13),
we obtain
. all for
)) ( 1 (













- - ‡ g
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On the other hand, since  ) )), 1 ( ), ( (( 1 0 t
E E R t c t c + ﬁ ((1, e), r(NT)),
we can assure that  ) ( 0 t c
E  is increasing (see theorem 4, in Gale, 1973),
and therefore  1
)) ( 1 (









 for all t large enough, so that g > Rt–1,
for all t large enough, and the claim is proven. j
IV.2. Interpretation
Suppose that  Z ˛ + t t
E E R t c t c ) )), 1 ( ), ( (( 1 0  denotes any equilibrium such h
that  ) )), 1 ( ), ( (( 1 0 t
E E R t c t c + ﬁ ((1, e), r(NT)) and such that  0 ) ( 1 0 > - t c
E
for all t [ Z (recall footnote 6).10
Observe that, in this case, the set of the possible interest rates is
bounded by g (see theorem 3 (ii.2)). Now, in concordance with our hy-
pothesis that there is a bank completing the markets, we assume that
there is free entry regarding the possibility of installing a bank, that
is, we assume that the financial markets behave competitively. Con-
sequently, the actual interest rate active in the market will obviously
be the largest one among the possible ones.
10 The case when the equilibrium  Z ˛ + t t
E E R t c t c ) )), 1 ( ), ( (( 1 0  is such that there exists t such h
that  0 ) ( 1 0 < - t c
E  can be analized exactly as if it were a Garden of Eden Economy: At time t the
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Given these hypothesis, it follows at once the viability of our equi-
libria in theorems 1 and 2: Upon the possibility to offer g (the largest
possible interest rate), this will be the active interest rate in the
economy, and the Golden Rule equilibrium is achieved in a general
free market setting.
Summarizing, our alternative interpretation of the model consists
of assuming: 1) the existence of a bank that completes the markets;
2) that the financial markets behave competitively; 3) not to impose
the market clearing condition.
Now, our argument in order to assert that the equilibria given in
theorems 1 and 2 are more reasonable than the ones imposing the
market clearing conditions, directly follows from the points 1 to 3 above
and from the continuity of the utility function. Indeed, if the utility
function is continuous —as it was assumed—, we have that if
Z ˛ + t t
E E R t c t c ) )), 1 ( ), ( (( 1 0  denotes any equilibrium such that  ), ( (( 0 t c
E
) )), 1 ( 1 t
E R t c + ﬁ ((1, e), r(NT)), then
) , ( )) 1 ( ), ( (( 1 0 1 0
GR GR E E c c u t c t c u < +  for all t large enough,
since  ) , 1 ( ) , ( 1 0 e u c c u
GR GR > .
Therefore, in the case of theorem 1, taking T large enough in such
a way that  ) , ( )) 1 ( ), ( ( 1 0 1 0
GR GR E E c c u t c t c u < +  and g > Rt for all t $ T (recall
(ii.2) in theorem 3) and therefore having the banks the option to offer
g (the largest possible interest rate), because of the competition in the
financial markets, all banks will offer g; on the other hand, since the
generation T prefer  ) , ( 1 0
GR GR c c u  than  )) 1 ( ), ( ( 1 0 + T c T c u
E E , no consumer
will hesitate in accepting g, so that the Golden Rule steady state be-
comes the effective equilibrium path in the economy from T on.
The argument in the case of the Garden of Eden Economy is to-
tally analogue and hence it is omitted.
V. Final Remarks
In this paper we consider the important question of selecting equilib-
ria in models with multiple equilibria. The main result of this paper is
to select the best equilibrium in a basic OLG model in a Samuelson
type economy. Our argument is twofold: 1) The market clearing condi-
tion need not always to hold, as it is indeed in a real world economy;
2) In order to understand the ultimate sense of the basic OLG model, iteconomía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIII, núm. 2, segundo semestre de 2004 207
needs to be completed describing the mechanism that completes the
markets. Our argument is, therefore, to assume the existence of com-
petitive financial markets.
So, Why in the basic model the local stability of the Non-Trade
Steady State in a Samuelson Case Economy was obtained? The an-
swer is because it was inappropriately assumed the market clearing
condition (our argument 1 above). Our second question: Is it possible
to offer a reasonable alternative view in such a way that the Golden
Rule equilibrium is obtained? The answer is yes: Assuming the exist-
ence of a competitive financial market that completes the markets
(our argument 2 above), the Golden Rule is reached as the final part
of a path without any intervention of a government or social security
system, just competition in a general sense.
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